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IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID?: EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD
BY SUNG-JIN CHO, HARRY J. PAARSCH, AND JOHN RUST
Seoul National University, University of Melbourne, and University of Maryland
We present ﬁeld evidence involving experienced bidders that supports the link-
ageprinciple—speciﬁcally,thepredictionthatinafﬁliated-valuesauctionenvironments
the expected revenues generated at open-outcry, ascending-bid (English) auctions are
higher than those under other auction formats that reveal less information to partic-
ipants. Using ﬁeld data from a large seller of automobiles which experimented with
different selling formats, we ﬁnd that the seller’s average revenues were signiﬁcantly
higher under an English auction than under a dynamic Internet auction that revealed
far less information to bidders.
1. Introduction and Motivation. In an inﬂuential and classic paper, Milgrom and Weber [1982] de-
rived a powerful result, and coined the term linkage principle to describe it. Simply put, in auction environ-
ments having afﬁliated values, the linkage principle states that a seller can expect to increase revenues by
providing more information to bidders, both before and during the auction. An implication of the linkage
principle is that open-outcry, ascending-price auctions (often referred to as English auctions) will, on aver-
age, earn more revenue for the seller than sealed-bid auctions, under which no information is released, or
similar auction formats that reveal less information to potential buyers. According to Perry and Reny [1999],
“the linkage principle has come to be considered one of the fundamental lessons provided by auction theory.”
Well-known exceptions to the linkage principle exist: for example, within independent private-values
environments, the celebrated Revenue Equivalence Theorem, ﬁrst outlined by Vickrey [1961, 1962] and then
proven by Riley and Samuelson [1981] as well as Myerson [1981], states that any auction format that has
the same probability of assigning a winning bidder generates the same expected revenue to the seller. In
particular, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem predicts that the expected revenues earned by the seller at
sealed-bid auctions will be the same as those earned at English auctions, at least when the distribution from
which the values are drawn is the same for all potential buyers, who are also risk-neutral.
Thus, the presence of some degree of dependence, or a common-value component, in the signals of poten-
tial buyers is critical to the validity of the linkage principle. The afﬁliated-values model is a generalization
of the common-value model developed by Wilson [1977]. Under afﬁliation, the conditional expectation of
any monotonic function of the signals of all bidders is an increasing function of any individual bidder’s own
signal. When the signals of bidders are dependent in this manner, information released by the seller or in-
formation the seller provides concerning the bids made by other participants (by virtue of the seller’s choice
of auction format) helps bidders reﬁne their beliefs concerning the true value of the object for sale, which in
turn induces them to bid more aggressively than they would in the absence of such information.
While one can imagine circumstances under which the release of information could adversely affect the
outcomeatanauction(forexample,ifthesellerreleasedinformationconcerningproblemswiththeobjectfor
sale, or when low bids by some bidders convince other bidders that the item is worth less than they originally
thought), the remarkable feature of the linkage principle is that, ex ante, providing more information raises
the expected revenues to the seller. Milgrom and Weber [1982] have summarized the implications of the
linkage principle succinctly: “honesty is the best policy.”
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The linkage principle can fail for other reasons. For example, Perry and Reny [1999] have presented a
counter-example to the linkage principle in a multi-unit auction. Another reason why the linkage principle
may fail is when bidders collude. In general, collusion is easier to sustain in environments that are rich in
information than when little information is released: English auctions release more information than sealed-
bid ones, or other less open auction formats.
To our knowledge, the speciﬁc implication of the linkage principle that English auctions should, on av-
erage, generate higher revenues than sealed-bid ones, or other less open auction formats, has never been
subjected to a direct empirical test, at least not using data from “the ﬁeld.” All of the empirical tests that
we know of have been conducted using controlled laboratory experiments. In an important series of papers,
Kagel and Levin [1986] and Levin et al. [1996] analyzed the behavior of laboratory subjects at English and
sealedbidauctionsinsituationswhereacommon-valuecomponentexistedintheirexperimentally-generated
values.
The results of these experiments, summarized in Kagel and Levin [2002], are mixed. For relatively inex-
perienced subjects, they found a pronounced “winner’s curse” caused by overbidding at sealed-bid auctions
relative to English ones. On average, the overbidding caused the seller’s revenues to be higher at sealed-bid
auctionsthanatEnglishauctions,contrarytothepredictionofthelinkageprinciple.However,inexperiments
involving experienced bidders, the winner’s curse was ameliorated and the English auctions generated higher
expected revenues than the sealed-bid ones, a ﬁnding consistent with the linkage principle.
We present an empirical analysis of (uncontrolled) ﬁeld experiments conducted by a large rental car
company that sells hundreds of unwanted, used cars each month.1 The rental car company is obviously quite
interested in adopting a selling mechanism or an auction format that maximizes the revenues it can earn from
the sale of its unwanted inventory of used cars.
While there are certainly individual-speciﬁc, private-value components in any automobile purchase (“I
really want that pink Cadillac over there, you know, the one with the cream leather seats, because ... ”),
common-value elements must surely exist, too. Speciﬁcally, a pre-owned vehicle’s true quality is uncertain
because the intensity with which it has been used and the care shown it by previous drivers are unknown.
This unknown quality is basically the same to all potential buyers, but will remain undiscovered until the
vehicle has exchanged hands and the new owner has experienced it on the road. In short, we do not think it
unreasonable to assume afﬁliation among the signals of potential buyers of used cars.
At any given point in time, the rental car company’s ﬂeet contains more than 30,000 vehicles; over the
last decade, the company has sold approximately 400 vehicles each month. During this period, the company
has sold used cars under four different selling mechanisms: ﬁrst, at open-outcry, ascending-price auctions
conducted by the rental car company at individual car rental outlets; second, at computerized Internet auc-
tions held in cyberspace; third, at open-outcry, ascending-price auctions conducted by a large auction house
at a central location; and, fourth, through bilateral bargaining between company managers and individual
customers who have rented cars under long-term rental contracts. We refer to these different methods of
selling used cars as sales regimes and our analysis is focused on the simple question of determining which
of these sales regimes yielded the highest average revenue to the rental car company.
Prior to developing its own specialized Internet auction software, the rental car company sold most used
cars at open-outcry, ascending-price auctions conducted at individual car rental outlets; in addition, a rel-
atively few used cars were sold directly to individual customers who had rented vehicles under long-term
rental contracts after informal bilateral bargaining with the customer. However, in 2002, the rental car com-
pany began to suspect that collusion among some participants at some of its English auctions. The rental car
company then invested in developing a unique auction format for selling used cars online. The participants
1The rental car company which provided us the data has requested that it remain anonymous. In addition, we are restricted from
providing information that could identify the company as well as any individual vehicles, customers, or bidders.IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 3
under this Internet-auction selling mechanism were strictly anonymous. Over the course of an Internet auc-
tion, which was two minutes in duration, an individual bidder would only see a single piece of information:
whether his bid was the highest competing bid at the auction. Participants could not observe the bids of their
opponents. In fact, an individual bidder did not even know what the highest bid was at any time during the
auction, unless the bidder himself had the current highest bid.
By 2007, the volume of vehicles the company was selling at its Internet auctions was so large that the
enterprisebegantooccupytoomuchofitsmanagers’time;managementbegantoregardtheInternetauctions
as a distraction from their main business—renting cars. Thus, the company decided to contract with a large,
prominent auction house to sell the used cars. The auction house employs an open-outcry, ascending-bid
auction that is virtually identical to an economist’s notion of an English auction. In particular, unlike the
company’s Internet auctions, a bidder at an English auction conducted by the auction house could see the
other participating bidders as well as their bids at each stage in the auction, including the highest bid at any
point in the auction. The auction house charges a variable commission rate for its services, but the average
commission rate is approximately ten percent of a vehicle’s gross selling price.
We have analyzed empirically the traded prices received by the rental car company (including prices net
of commission in the case of sales by the auction house) over the period 2002 to 2008 under the four different
selling mechanisms. We have compared revenues for speciﬁc vehicle classes and individual makes/models
of vehicles for which we have the largest number of observations. While in each month the company sells a
large number of vehicles in total, the numbers of vehicles sold for speciﬁc makes and models in any given
month are insufﬁcient to employ a “regression discontinuity” approach where net revenues for a speciﬁc
makes/models are compared just before and just after the transition from one sales regime to another, such
as the transition from the company’s Internet auctions to sales through the auction house, which began on
1 January 2008.
Instead, we have averaged prices over the much larger numbers of vehicles sold during entire sales
regimes, not just the much smaller numbers of vehicles sold around sales-regime transitions. We justify
this approach by noting that, during the period of our analysis, there were no sigiﬁcant “macro shocks”
or inﬂation in the used-car market in the country where the rental company operates, something we shall
document in section 3. In addition, no signiﬁcant changes occurred in the engine or other features and char-
acteristics of the speciﬁc car models we analyzed. Thus, we feel we can rule-out these explanations for the
signiﬁcant shifts in prices across different sales regimes. In short, we believe that a simple comparison of
average prices received for speciﬁc high-volume vehicle makes and models provides an appropriate basis
for measuring the effect of the sales regime and selling mechanism on revenues earned by the seller.
In general, our empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the prediction of the linkage principle. Speciﬁcally,
comparing traded prices for mid-sized vehicles under the two main sales regimes, where the vast majority
of our observations exist (the company’s own Internet auctions and the English auctions conducted by the
auction house), net revenues earned by the rental car company were, on average, signiﬁcantly higher at the
English auction than at the Internet auctions that released less information. However, we found that revenues
earned at the English auctions conducted by the rental car company were, on average, signiﬁcantly lower
than either of these two sales regimes. This evidence suggests that the rental car company was correct in
suspecting that bidder collusion was at play at the English auctions conducted at the individual car rental
outlets, and this suspected collusion led to lower average prices than those earned under the other sales
regimes.
In the case of bilateral bargaining between company managers and individual customers who had rented
them under long-term rental contracts, the average prices received were less than at the Internet auctions and
less than the average net prices received from the auction house, but more than the average prices received at
the English auctions conducted by the rental car company. This ﬁnding is also consistent with the possible4 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST
existence of collusion at the English auctions conducted by the rental car company.
We also found, however, that when we analyzed speciﬁc makes/models of cars (and we considered three
for which we have the largest number of observations) the rankings of the four sales regimes differed across
the three models. For car Model A (again the speciﬁc make/model has been suppressed due to conﬁdentiality
restrictions imposed by the rental car company), the average price earned was highest under the English
auction conducted by the auction house (again, net of commmission), followed by bilateral bargaining, then
the Internet auctions; the lowest average revenues obtained at the English auctions conducted by the rental
car company. For car Model B, the average revenues under Internet auctions, English auctions conducted
by the auction house, and bilateral bargaining were about the same and not signiﬁcantly different from one
another, but all three of these sales regimes generated higher revenues, on average, than did the English
auctions conducted by the rental car company: the differences were signiﬁcant at conventional p-values. For
car Model C, there were not enough observations for the auctions conducted by the rental car company or
under bilateral bargaining to draw any statistically reliable conclusions, but the average net revenues earned
at the English auctions conducted by the auction house were signiﬁcantly greater than those at the Internet
auctions; the difference was statistically signiﬁcant at conventional p-values.
Overall,theseﬁndingssupporttheconclusionthatbiddercollusionwasadistinctpossibilityattheEnglish
auctions conducted by the rental car company, and this could explain why this open-outcry auction format
generated lower average prices than the rental car company’s reduced-information Internet auction format,
a result that would be inconsistent with the linkage principle, at least when collusion is ignored. Thus,
when cooperation among potential buyers is present, reducing bidder information in the way the rental
car company did at its Internet auctions can be an effective way to thwart collusion and, thus, increase
average revenues. Nevertheless, other means of policing or thwarting collusion may exist, too. We do not
know how the auction house, which also operates an open-outcry auction, succeeded in thwarting collusion,
but we found that this selling mechanism resulted in the highest average net revenues to the rental car
company, consistentwiththepredictions ofthelinkageprinciple.Anotherpossibleexplanation forthehigher
average revenues from the auction house could, however, be demand aggregation: the auction house may
have succeeded in attracting more bidders than were present under the other sales regimes. In the conclusion,
we discuss reasons why we do not think that the somewhat larger number of bidders who participated at the
auction-house auctions could explain the signiﬁcantly greater average sales prices under this sales regime.
Overall, the single most important message to take from our analysis is the following conclusion: consis-
tent with the prediction of the linkage principle, the average traded price of vehicles was signiﬁcantly higher
at the open-outcry, ascending-price auctions conducted by the auction house than the closed Internet auction
implemented by the rental car company. The Internet auctions may have been successful in thwarting the
collusion potentially present at the English auctions conducted by the rental car company at each of its car
rental outlets. If there were any collusion by participants at the English auctions conducted by the auction
house, then it does not appear to have been successful because the average prices are the highest under
this sales regime—especially when we consider the gross traded price and not the net traded price actually
received by the car rental company.
We believe our ﬁndings are signiﬁcant because they represent the ﬁrst empirical test of the linkage prin-
ciple that we know of using ﬁeld data concerning experienced bidders. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the
evidence found by Kagel et al. [1987] concerning experienced bidders in laboratory experiments. After we
completed this paper, we became aware of a paper by Tadelis and Zettelmeyer [2010], who reported results
from a controlled experiment conducted at a different rental car company and designed to test a different
implication of the linkage principle—viz., whether the ex ante release of information concerning the me-
chanical conditions and repair histories of vehicles being sold at wholesale automobile auctions increased
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traded prices, which is also consistent with the linkage principle. However, in their research, they did not
undertake experiments that show the effect of the selling mechanism on average traded prices, the main
contribution of this paper.
The remainder of our paper is in three sections: in section 2, we describe in some detail the four sales
regimes as well as the data, while in section 3, we presents a summary of our empirical analysis and, in
section 4, we summarize and conclude our research.
2. Data. During the period for which we have data, from the last quarter of 2002 onward, essentially
four different sales regimes existed in the rental car company we are studying. For lack of imagination, but
for parsimony, we refer to them in order as Regimes 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. For ease of reference by the
reader, in table 1, we provide summary descriptions of the sales regimes.
TABLE 1
Description of Sales Regimes
Sales Regime Description
Regime 1 English auctions conducted by rental car company at individual rental outlets.
Regime 2 Internet auctions conducted in cyberspace by rental car company.
Regime 3 English auctions conducted by auction house at large central site.
Regime 4 Bilateral bargaining between company managers and individual customers.
Like many companies, the one whose practices we are studying started small. Thus, Regime 1 was the
traditional way in which to sell used cars—at English auction. These English auctions were conducted at
each of the rental outlets of the company, so competition was probably not high. Because the control methods
in the early life of the company did not involve computers, the data from this period are scant. Even when
computers were introduced, for reservations and so forth, this did not trickle down to selling vehicles until
much later in the company’s history. In any case, we really only have part of one year’s data concerning this
period. In addition, the organization of auctions during this regime was less than optimal, dictated more by
tradition and the personality of the manager than by thoughtful purpose. Speciﬁcally, within the company,
it was believed by some that collusion among potential buyers was possibly preventing the company from
getting the fair value for its used cars.
In response to this situation, at the beginning of 2003, the company implemented Regime 2, which in-
volvedconductingelectronicauctionsovertheInternet.Theseelectronicauctionswereheldatpre-announced
times each month; vehicles were sold one at a time in a particular order over the Internet at auctions lasting
exactly two minutes each.2 At these auctions, a potential buyer could submit as many bids as he liked. How-
ever, the only information available to any participant was whether he was the highest bidder. Speciﬁcally,
none of the participants knew how many bidders were active at the auction. Because of these institutional
features, unlike at the electronic auctions used by eBay, referred to as the California auction format by
Steiglitz [2007], it was virtually impossible to snipe effectively: except for the current highest bidder, none
of the other participants knew what the current price was, so only a lucky sniper could sneak in at the last
second to “steal” a vehicle away from the existing highest bidder.3 At the end of the auction, the highest bid-
2In practice, the time stamps in the electronic ﬁles document that some of the auctions were, in fact, as long as 121 seconds, but we
believe that this heterogeneity is unimportant.
3Sniping at auctions refers to the practice of observing a timed online auction, such as those electronic auctions organized by eBay,
and then placing a winning bid at the last possible moment, typically in the ﬁnal seconds of the auction. Because opponents cannot
always respond in time, a sniper may win the object at a price lower than were the sniped bid submitted earlier in the auction. On the
Amazon electronic auction site, any bid submitted in the last ten minutes of the auction prolongs the end of the auction by another
ten minutes, making it impossible to snipe; for more on this, see Bajari and Hortac ¸su [2004] or Roth and Ockenfels [2006]. At both
eBay and Amazon auctions, the current price is known to all, unlike at the Internet auctions we study, where it is known only to one
participant—the current highest bidder.6 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST
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FIG 1. Sequence of Bids Observed at a Representative Internet Auction
der won, and paid what he bid. Thus, the pricing rule at these auctions was ﬁrst-price (pay-your-bid) rather
than second-price. Because of bid increments, the pricing rule at California auctions is an hybrid between the
ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions; for more on the importance of bid increments at California auctions,
see Hickman [in press]. In short, the electronic auctions conducted by the rental car company were really
nothing like the well-known California auctions conducted by eBay.
By eliminating a public forum in which signals could be discreetly exchanged and in which coopera-
tive behavior could be monitored (and, thus, potentially enforced) by the colluders, the rental car company
believed it could thwart uncompetitive behavior among the potential buyers. What made these ﬁrst-price
auctions different from other ﬁrst-price auctions typically used is that a bidder could, by trial-and-error,
discover what the highest current tender was. By allowing participants to increase their bids sequentially,
some information release was permitted, unlike in the models of standard ﬁrst-price auctions studied by
Milgrom and Weber [1982].
The company also restricted who could participate at the Internet auctions. In particular, only a set of 95
used-car dealers were given computer accounts. These dealers were obvious resellers of pre-owned vehicles:
historically, they had purchased many vehicles from the rental car company, solely for the purpose of resale.
Because the Internet auctions were electronic, data collection was relatively easy. Essentially, we have
access to virtually every piece of relevant information concerning the auctions. The only exception is a three-
month period in 2004, during which the company was unable to provide us access to any transaction data.
We do not believe there is any hidden agenda here: the most likely explanation is that the data were simply
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In ﬁgure 1, we present a graph of the sequence of bids observed at a representative Internet auction. There
were nine bidders participating at this auction, which lasted two minutes. The solid line plots the highest bid
received at each instant, and the various symbols plot the actual bids submitted by the nine bidders. Three
of the bidders—6, 8, and 9—tendered only a single bid at the auction. Bidder 6 submitted the highest bid
20,000 at the 77.953-second mark of the auction. This remained the highest bid for the remainder of the two
minute auction and, consequently, bidder 6 won the auction and paid 20,000.
It is quite unusual to see the large number of “dominated” bids being placed at this auction. Of course, this
occurs because of the limited information that the auctioneer provides to the bidders. As we noted, no bidder
can observe the number of other bidders or the bids they have placed in the auction: the only information a
bidder observes is whether his bid is the highest. Consequently, we see obvious “testing strategies”’ being
used by the other six bidders, who gradually increased their bids in an attempt to become the high bidder and
possibly also to learn what the high bid was at that moment of the auction. It is, however, evident that several
bidders never succeeded in learning what the high bid was since their bids were always below the high bid
at the auction. Examples include bidders 2 and 3, whose bids are plotted as circles as well as ﬁve-pointed
stars, respectively, in ﬁgure 1.
Clearly, the Internet auction provides more information to bidders than what they would receive at a
single-shot sealed-bid auction. In particular, a bidder can start out with low bids and increase them gradually
in attempt to learn what the high bid is. But, as we see in ﬁgure 1, this strategy is not always successful. In
fact, most of the bidders who won most frequently at the Internet auctions placed only a small number of
bids, often just a single bid very close to the end of the auction. This strategy is similar to the type of bid
sniping observed at eBay auctions, but not as effective.
It is also clear that the information provided to bidders at the Internet auction is less than what they would
observe at an English auction, such as the auctions conducted by the auction house where all bidders see
all bids placed by other bidders, including the winning bid. Furthermore, bidders can also potentially know
the identities of the competing bidders because they are physically present and are calling out their bids
on the auction ﬂoor. Thus, the information provided to bidders at the Internet auction is greater than the
information provided at a sealed-bid auction, but less than the information provided at an English auction. If
bidders are not colluding and their values are afﬁliated, then the linkage principle predicts that the English
auction should generate higher expected revenues to the seller than the Internet auction, but the Internet
auction should generate higher expected revenues than a sealed-bid auction.
Unfortunately, the rental car company did not sell any of its vehicles at sealed-bid auctions, so we are
unable to test the latter implication of the linkage principle. However, our intuition is that the value of
using “testing strategies”’ and attempting to learn the value of the high bid is limited in these fast-moving
auctions. We conjecture that the Internet auctions are “strategically close” to sealed-bid auctions in the sense
that expected revenues are not much higher than those that would obtain at sealed-bid auctions. In separate
work, we plan to test this conjecture by solving a model of equilibrium bidding strategies at the Internet
auction and comparing expected revenues to those that arise at a sealed-bid auction. To our knowledge, the
Internet auction used by the rental car company is a unique auction institution that has never been analyzed
either theoretically or empirically in the previous literature concerning auctions.
By 2007, conducting the electronic auctions had become a distraction to managing the company: the
auctions were occupying too much time. Thus, management sought to exit this business. What the rental
car company did was hire an auction house to conduct the sales on its behalf. In return, the ﬁrm selling the
vehicles would receive a commission that varied according to the make of vehicle; the average commission
rate was about ten percent of the gross sales price. We refer to this period, which began on 1 January 2008,
as Regime 3.
The auction house chose to sell the vehicles using the auction format that used-car dealers know best—the8 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST
English auction format, a second-price rule. Because the auction house is rewarded using a commission, this
ﬁrm presumably had an incentive to design the auctions in a better way than had been done under Regime
1. While the rental car company has been quite generous with providing us information and in answering
our questions, we have no close relationship with the auction house. One of the authors has attended several
Regime 3 auctions. From this ﬁeld research, we see no obvious differences from other English auctions used
to sell pre-owned vehicles. Of course, none of the authors observed the Regime 1 English auctions, so we
cannot make direct comparisons between the Regime 1 and 3 auctions.
The information gathered under Regime 3 is quite different. Under its contract with the rental car com-
pany, the auction house is only required to report the date and time of an auction as well as the winning bid
received for each vehicle sold as listed on a manifest. We know from the auction house that the potential
buyers under Regime 3 are the dealers who participated under Regime 2, plus any private buyers who also
want to participate. It seems unlikely that any additional used-car dealers also chose to participate because
the rental car company was quite inclusive when it assigned computer accounts under Regime 2 for the most
obvious reason: it wanted to sell its used cars, and believed the more potential participants the higher the
price. Presumably, the rental car company excluded private buyers under Regime 2 because it would have
been an administrative nightmare to deal with a large number of potentially inexperienced bidders trading
over the Internet.4
At the same time the auction house has been conducting auctions, the rental car company has also pursued
a fourth way to sell vehicles—bilateral bargaining. Like most rental car companies, the one we are studying
rents to customers who only need vehicles for short periods of time, such as travellers arriving at airports.
But the ﬁrm also leases vehicles for long periods (for example, one to three years) to other clients. The
“demographics” of the inventory of vehicles sold under bilateral bargaining are essentially representative of
the ﬂeet at large. What differs are the buyers. Many of those who purchased vehicles from the rental car
company under Regime 4 were long-term clients who had previously held leases of a year or more, and
presumably knew well the vehicles they were purchasing. Some of these clients had other contracts with the
ﬁrm. Why bring this up? Well, some of these long-term lessees have better bargaining positions than do the
bidders at auctions. Of course, the rental car company is in a strong position as well: those vehicles not sold
under bargaining can always be sold at auction.
Note, too, that it seems plausible that higher quality vehicles are sold under bargaining than at auction: of
the long-term lessees looking to purchase a vehicle, those who have had good experiences with their vehicles
(so the high-quality vehicles) would be more likely to offer high prices, which the rental car company is more
likely to accept, leaving the remainder to be sold at auction. This sort of adverse selection problem is similar
to that ﬁrst described by Akerlof [1970].
The information gathered under Regime 4 is basically the same as that under Regime 3. Speciﬁcally, the
date and time of an auction as well as the winning bid received for each vehicle sold as listed on a manifest;
a winner identiﬁcation number also exists as well.
We organized all of the data concerning the 30,621 sales that we acquired from the rental car company
into a dataset. Because different amounts and kinds of information were generated under the different selling
mechanism, in making empirical comparisons across the different selling mechanism, we are constrained by
the least-complete data-collection scheme. Speciﬁcally, the only information we have that is comparable
across all of the selling regimes is the following:
1) date of sale;
2) vehicle identiﬁcation number;
3) vehicle model;
4As we shall describe below, even some of the experienced participants made costly errors, albeit infrequently.IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 9
4) vehicle age;
5) purchase price of vehicle;5
6) sale price of vehicle;
7) type of sale;
8) identiﬁcation number of winner for Regimes 2, 3, and 4.6
For some vehicles, we have an odometer reading for the vehicle and know whether that vehicle has been in
an accident, but these data are unavailable for many vehicles. Speciﬁcally, we have no odometer readings
for vehicles sold under Regime 1, and nearly ﬁfteen percent of the vehicles sold under the other regimes
have missing odometer readings as well. The information concerning accidents is reliable for around ﬁfteen
percent of the observations in Regimes 2, 3, and 4; it is non-existent under Regime 1. Put another way, if we
constrain ourselves to observations that have complete mileage and accident histories, then the remaining
samples are extremely small.
UnderRegime2,weknowthecompletebiddinghistoriesofallparticipants,butnoothersuchinformation
exists for Regimes 1, 3, and 4. At none of the auctions did a reserve price exist. None of the vehicles went
unsold. However, under Regime 2, some bidders made errors. Let us explain: infrequently, a bidder made a
keystroke error, which resulted in his winning the auction at a ridiculously high price—e.g., several hundreds
of thousands of dollars for a vehicle worth less than ten thousand dollars. At the close of the auction, this
mistake was realized. At this point, the company, voided the sale, and resold the vehicle at a later auction.
The practical importance of such cases is trivially small.
3. Empirical Results. While we have data concerning the sales of nearly 31,000 vehicles, most of
these data are not strictly comparable with one another. In addition, as was alluded to above, trying to control
for differences in observed covariates collected across each of the regimes is difﬁcult because different types
of information were gathered under the four regimes. Thus, in order to avoid the potential biases that can
arise when, for example, comparing the sale of a Mercury Sable with the sale of a Jeep Cherokee (viz.,
comparing apples and oranges), we have chosen to focus on relatively homogeneous products. Of course,
there are limits to how ﬁne we can go; these limits are largely determined by the information provided us
by the rental car company concerning models. Note, too, that by restricting ourselves in this way, we have
also reduced the potential samples sizes in our analysis: we must trade-off decreased bias with increased
sampling variation.
Over thirty-seven percent (11,504 of 30,621) of the sales in our dataset involved mid-sized vehicles of
various models. Thus, we focused on those ﬁrst.
In table 2, we report the sample descriptive statistics for mid-sized vehicles under the four regimes.
Switching from the English auctions of Regime 1 to the Internet auctions of Regime 2 probably made
proﬁts for the rental car company: in real terms, the average traded price rose around 14.7 percent.7 We say
“probably” because we do not know what it costs to run either of these auctions, but a nearly ﬁfteen percent
improvement is substantial, and impressive. This increase also supports the hunch that some within the rental
car company had; viz., collusion among potential buyers was likely a problem under Regime 1.
When the company switched to Regime 3, where the auction house conducted English auction the average
traded price rose around 4.7 percent over its Regime 2 counterpart. As was noted above, the rental car
company pays auction house a commission for conducting the auction which averages out to be about ten
percent of the gross revenues. It is important to note that the price data we received from the auction house
5For around 0.15 percent of the vehicles in the dataset, the initial purchase price is unknown.
6For around ﬁve percent of these sales, the identity of the winner is unknown. Also, under Regime 3, the winner is listed as 16, the
ﬁrm who conducted the auctions, rather than the actual winner.
7We made the CPI 1.00 for July 2005, around the midpoint of our sample.10 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST
TABLE 2
Sample Descriptive Statistics—All Regimes; Mid-Sized Vehicles
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4
English Internet English
Variable Statistic Auctions Auctions Auctions Bilateral
Rental Car Rental Car Auction Bargaining
Company Company House
Mean 6261.68 7255.08 7605.51 7088.77
St.Dev. 1730.93 2188.96 2020.30 2751.28
Traded Price Median 6253.11 7183.07 7770.44 6001.87
Lower Quartile 5056.26 6011.54 6573.84 5048.80
Upper Quartile 7518.28 8279.73 8787.28 9569.29
Mean 1180.24 1080.20 1120.58 1135.65
St.Dev. 206.46 179.43 135.32 163.73
Age (in days) Median 1170 1178 1102 1105
Lower Quartile 1140 972 1041 1047
Upper Quartile 1200 1141 1147 1144
Sample Size 246 6,214 4,208 835
are net of that commission, the rate of which varies from vehicle to vehicle. Thus, under Regime 3, the rental
car company does not have to incur selling costs, such as those incurred when running the Internet auctions
under Regime 2: all auction-related costs under Regime 3 are borne by the auction house. In short, while this
increase in prices is relatively small, it is a lower bound on the proﬁt that the rental car company is making
by switching auction formats and pricing rules.
The average traded price under bilateral bargain, Regime 4, is less than either the Regime 2 average or
the average net traded price under Regime 3, and negotiations are not without costs either. Unfortunately,
the magnitudes of these negotiation costs are unknown to us and, perhaps, the rental car company as well,
so we cannot put a ﬁrm ﬁgure one the average difference, but do know that, under Regime 3, the rental car
company is doing better than under negotiation.
While these differences are obviously economically important, the question of whether any one is statis-
tically signiﬁcant remains. Conventional standard errors for the sample means can be calculated using the
information provided in the table; i.e., simply divide the reported standard deviation under each regime by
the square root of the sample size reported for that regime to get the standard error. We also calculated the
asymptotic test statistics for each of the pair-wise differences: the p-values are uniformly below 0.01, so the
differences are unlikely the result of sampling errors.
The main point to take from this part of the analysis is the following revenue ranking:
English Auction (auction house) > First-Price Auction (auction house) >
Bilateral Bargaining > English Auction (rental car company).
Thus, our ﬁndings are mixed: the English auctions conducted by the auction house generated the highest
average traded prices, but those conducted by the rental care company generated the lowest average traded
pricess. If, however, we assume that the English auctions conducted by the rental car company reﬂect the
effects of collusion and the other auctions are unaffected by collusion, then the ﬁrst inequality is consistent
with the linkage principle. To wit, as Milgrom and Weber [1982] as well as Ausubel [2004] have counselled,
information release matters and, as Bulow and Klemperer [1996] have predicted, auctions (appropriately
designed) are better for the seller than negotiation, the second inequality.
The rental car company appears to have made a wise decision when it switched from the English auction
used in Regime 1. However, without knowing the magnitude of the costs involved in conducting the Regime
2 Internet auctions, it is impossible to know whether the switch to Regime 2 from Regime 1 was proﬁtable.IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 11
































































FIG 2. Empirical Distribution Functions of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized Vehicles
We have been unable to obtain from the rental car company usable data to estimate the costs of conducting
the Internet auctions. On the other hand, because the prices at the Regime 3 auctions are net of commissions,
which means no other costs were incurred to sell the unwanted vehicles, and because the average price
at Regime 3 auctions is greater than those at either Regime 1 or Regime 2 auctions, this last change was
certainly proﬁtable.
In ﬁgure 2, we depict the empirical distribution functions (EDFs) of traded prices under the four regimes.
Except at the very top end, above about the 85th percentile, the EDF of Regime 3 is to the right of that
of Regime 2. When, however, Milgrom and Weber [1982] used the linkage principle to prove the revenue
ranking of the auction formats and pricing rules, they did not characterize the effect that the formats and
rules have on the distributions of traded prices, just the averages of traded prices.
Wenote,however,thatinsingle-objectmodels,withinthesymmetricindependentprivate-valueparadigm,
with risk-neutral bidders, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds. In addition, the distribution of winning
bids at ﬁrst-price auctions and that at second-price auctions can be ranked in terms of second-order stochastic
dominance. Speciﬁcally, the latter involves a mean-preserving spread of the former. Within the Milgrom–
Weber model, with afﬁliated signals, we know of no formal result along these lines. Nevertheless, under
afﬁliation, the right tail of the winning bid distribution at a second-price auction is likely longer than that at
a ﬁrst-price auction, suggesting an inconsistency between the data and the theory.
Of course, the reader may worry that contamination, in the form of mis-reported traded prices or mis-
classiﬁed vehicles, could affect our empirical results because, as an estimator, the sample mean has a very
low breakdown point; see, for example, Huber [1981] as well as Belsley et al. [1980]. Contamination also12 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST
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FIG 3. Estimated Kernel-Smoothed Densities of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized Vehicles
has implications for what can learned from the data, as was noted out by Horowitz and Manski [1997].
In an effort to demonstrate the robustness of our results, we have reported the samples medians as well as
lower and upper quartiles in table 2.8 For example, the estimated sample median of Regime 3 is greater than
that of Regime 2 at size 0.01. But this is not an implication of the linkage principle, simply corroborating
evidence supporting the notion that the English auction generates more information than the sealed-bid
auction, and this release of information increases the average revenues garnered under the English auction.
In ﬁgure 3, we depict the estimated kernel-smoothed densities of traded prices where we used a Gaussian
kernel with the bandwith parameter recommended by Silverman [1986]—viz., 4T−1/5ˆ s/3. Here, ˆ s denotes
the estimated standard deviation of trade prices, while T denotes the sample size. Nothing new concerning
the traded-price processes under Regimes 1, 2, and 3 is really learned from this exercise, but something
interesting is revealed about the traded-price process under Regime 4. In particular, the Regime 4 estimated
probability density function is distinctly bi-modal: this bi-modality is not a bi-product of smoothing as with
8To calculate standard errors of the sample percentiles, we used the following ﬁrst-order approximation for the qth population









where we used ˆ f(w), the kernel-smoothed estimate of the population probability density function of traded prices f0(w), evaluated at
the sample percentile ˆ x(q), to approximate f0[x0(q)]. We should note, however, that under contamination this standard error statistic is
not robust, even though the sample percentiles are, because (like the sample mean) the kernel-smoothed density estimator has a very
low breakdown point as well.IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 13
TABLE 3
Sample Descriptive Statistics—All Regimes; Mid-Sized, Model A
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4
English Internet English
Variable Statistic Auctions Auctions Auctions Bilateral
Rental Car Rental Car Auction Bargaining
Company Company House
Mean 6170.98 6848.55 7600.83 7387.44
St.Dev. 1577.97 2163.49 1783.51 2322.70
Traded Price Median 6163.95 6768.46 7725.55 6281.36
Lower Quartile 4972.65 5466.14 6894.59 5498.22
Upper Quartile 7342.91 8032.13 8527.45 9739.76
Mean 1194.36 1080.50 1128.50 1132.66
St.Dev. 184.52 170.51 119.83 167.06
Age (in days) Median 1170 1078 1112 1107
Lower Quartile 1140 980 1067 1045
Upper Quartile 1200 1141 1150 1139
Sample Size 218 2,591 1,750 321
the minor multi-modality for the Regime 2 and 3 data. Speciﬁcally, under Regime 4, there exists a low-
outcome part and an high-outcome part to the estimated probability density function, suggesting that some
buyers get outstanding deals, while others pay considerably more, perhaps because the vehicles are different
in some way. We shall return to this later in this section.
One obvious limitation of this analysis derives from the aggregation of all mid-sized vehicles into one
sample. Within the mid-sized category, however, the top three models account for over eight-ﬁve percent
(9,850 of 11,504) of mid-sized sales, around thirty-two percent of total sales. Thus, we next disaggregated
and focused on the top three models, individually. In tables 3, 4, 5 we present descriptive statistics for the
top three models of mid-sized vehicles. At the request of the rental car company, we do not refer to these
models by their names, but rather by letters of the alphabet—A, B, and C.
In general, the descriptive statistics for Models A and C, under Regimes 2 and 3, are basically like those
for the data concerning all mid-sized vehicles; i.e., for these models, the ranking of Regime 3 over Regime 2
remains. Because the sample sizes under Regime 1 for Models B and C are so small—6 and 4, respectively—
we did not consider these samples relevant in our analysis. What is a bit puzzling is that average revenues
under Regime 4 are signiﬁcantly greater than those under Regime 2 for both Models A and C.
The results for Model B are quite different. For this model, the average revenues are highest under
Regimes 4, and Regime 2 garners signiﬁcantly greater revenues than Regime 3, although the difference
is economically small—under three percent. What could be causing these differences?
One obvious, but compelling point emerges from the previous analysis: the vehicles sold could be differ-
ent in ways that the potential buyers can observe, but which we (as empirical analysts) cannot. We sought
to use observed covariates to control for such factors. One important source of heterogeneity is in the new
vehicle itself. While new model vehicles are remarkably homogeneous by some standards, considerable
variation can exist in the features those vehicles possess. For example, we may not know whether a vehicle
has the optional Powder White Pearl Paint or a sunroof or the Bluetooth Hands-Free Phone System, but the
purchase price will probably reﬂect a good portion of this heterogeneity. Thus, in order to deal with this het-
erogeneity, we used pt, the real purchase price of the tth vehicle, as a control for unobserved (to the analyst)
features of the vehicle. While we believe that the real new-car price is a reasonable sufﬁcient statistic for all
of the unknown features of a vehicle, we should note that this data series is all we have to control for this
type of heterogeneity. Also, we know that a vehicle’s age is important. For all vehicles in our dataset, we
know when the vehicle was bought and when it was sold—vehicle age, in days, which we then converted14 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST
TABLE 4
Sample Descriptive Statistics—All Regimes; Mid-Sized, Model B
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4
English Internet English
Variable Statistic Auctions Auctions Auctions Bilateral
Rental Car Rental Car Auction Bargaining
Company Company House
Mean 7176.21 7892.92 7622.54 8054.58
St.Dev. 2827.49 1767.16 2242.13 3008.55
Traded Price Median 7887.69 7560.50 8000.90 6896.07
Lower Quartile 5338.75 6802.27 6738.31 5361.17
Upper Quartile 9409.33 8640.78 9003.58 10870.49
Mean 1080.00 1110.08 1143.71 1126.15
St.Dev. 518.57 178.96 159.09 158.63
Age (in days) Median 960 1100 1105 1104
Lower Quartile 570 1000 1052 1052
Upper Quartile 1710 1165 1167 1144
Sample Size 6 2,779 1,347 316
TABLE 5
Sample Descriptive Statistics—All Regimes; Mid-Sized, Model C
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4
English Internet English
Variable Statistic Auctions Auctions Auctions Bilateral
Rental Car Rental Car Auction Bargaining
Company Company House
Mean 6008.04 4866.86 5639.53 5053.16
St.Dev. 3425.15 1888.64 1193.56 1384.69
Traded Price Median 7164.57 5227.72 5701.09 5403.73
Lower Quartile 2518.01 2780.98 5290.09 4826.97
Upper Quartile 8341.54 6178.67 6340.22 5854.04
Mean 915.00 1016.39 1108.97 1384.69
St.Dev. 90.00 159.13 148.83 198.33
Age (in days) Median 960 983 1059 1478
Lower Quartile 825 930 1003 1455
Upper Quartile 960 1088 1119 1478
Sample Size 4 341 145 32IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 15
































































FIG 4. Empirical Distribution Functions of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized, Model A
to years; we denote this variable by Age. We know, too, that past usage is important. For around eighty-ﬁve
percent of the vehicles sold (those under Regimes 2, 3, and 4), we know the odometer reading when the
vehicle left the ﬂeet, which we converted to tens of thousands of miles; we denote this variable by Mileage.9
When introducing observed covariate heterogeneity (denoted by the vector x, below) into econometric
models of auctions, only certain functional forms will lead to tractable empirical speciﬁcations. In partic-
ular, two different structures have typically been used to introduce observed covariates into the valuations
(denoted by Vs, below) of potential buyers. The ﬁrst is an additive form, like
Vnt = g(xt)+ent
for the nth potential buyer at the tth sale where g(·) is some (typically unknown) function, while the second
is a multiplicative form, like
Vnt = h(xt)ent
where h(·) is some (typically unknown) function. Here, ent denotes the unobserved bidder-speciﬁc hetero-
geneity in valuations.
Under these functional-form assumptions, the Bayes–Nash equilibrium bid function is of the form
b(Vnt) = g(xt)+b(ent)
9Some odometer readings were ridulously high, given the vehicle’s age—for example, several millions of miles. Others were
unusually low, again, given the vehicle’s age—for example, less than ten thousand miles. While the former odometer readings are
likely impossible, the latter are feasible, but we do not whether an odometer reading of 2 is really 1,000,002 miles, or a mis-reported
observations. Thus, we constrained ourselves to vehicles having mileages of less than one million and greater than ten thousand.16 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST























































FIG 5. Estimated Kernel-Smoothed Densities of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized, Model A
in the ﬁrst case, and
b(Vnt) = h(xt)b(ent)




where q and h are vectors of unknown parameters conformable to x.
We imagine the following separable empirical speciﬁcation relating (pt,Aget,Mileaget) toWit, the traded
price of the tth vehicle under Regime i:
Wit = r1(pt)r2(Aget)r3(Mileaget)li(St) (3.1)
Here, r1(pt) represents an unknown transformation of the real purchase price, r2(Aget) an unknown trans-
formation of Aget, r3(Mileaget) an unknown transformation of Mileaget, and li(St) an unknown transfor-
mation of the sale-t speciﬁc unobserved error term St. This latter transformation can vary across the selling
regimes i = 1,2,3,4. Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (3.1) yields
logWit = µ1(pt)+µ2(Aget)+µ3(Mileaget)+l0+(log[li(St)]−l0) (3.2)
where µj(·) denotes log[rj(·)], j = 1,2,3. Here, the unknown parameter l0 is introduced as a centering pa-
rameter: under the null hypothesis that the selling regime does not matter, the random variable (log[li(St)]−IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 17































































FIG 6. Empirical Distribution Functions of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized, Model B


















We estimated the following empirical speciﬁcation:
logWit = g0+g1logpt +g2Aget +g3Mileaget +Uit (3.3)18 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST






















































FIG 7. Estimated Kernel-Smoothed Densities of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized, Model B
by the method of least squares. We report our parameter estimates as well as robust standard errors in table
6. The estimated “depreciation” parameters for Age and Mileage make sense: in the ﬁrst year, a vehicle
is predicted to lose 22.45 percent of its value; controlling for vehicle age, an extra ten thousand miles is
predicted to reduce the vehicle’s value by around 2.75 percent. In ﬁgure 10, we present the EDFs of the
ﬁtted residuals (by Regime), while in ﬁgure 11, we present the estimated kernel-smoothed densities of the
ﬁtted residuals (by Regime). In table 7, we present the descriptive statistics. The most important statistic to
notice in this table is the mean: under Regime 3, the average residual is positive, while under Regime 2 it is
negative. The average difference in the gross traded prices is over ten percent We constructed a standard error
for this difference is using the bootstrap; the p-value for the hypothesis that the mean under Regime 3 was
greater than that for Regime 2 was less than 0.001. This evidence suggests that more information is released
under the English auction than under the sealed-bid auction, evidence supporting the linkage principle. What
remains puzzling is the fact that the variation in ﬁtted residuals is much smaller under Regime 3 than under
Regimes 2 or 4: theory would predict otherwise.
The bi-modality of traded prices under Regime 4 also represents a puzzle. Earlier, we conjectured that
long-term lessees of vehicles would have better information concerning the vehicles they were purchasing.
We also mentioned that some long-term clients had other contracts with the ﬁrm, so these potential buyers
might have better bargaining positions than do the bidders at auctions. It seems plausible, too, that higher
quality vehicles are sold under bargaining than at auction because the long-term lessees who had good
experiences with their vehicles would be more likely to offer high prices, which the rental car company is
more likely to accept, leaving the remainder to be sold at auction.IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 19































































FIG 8. Empirical Distribution Functions of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized, Model C
While we do not know whether certain winners under Regime 4 are long-term lessees, we do know which
winners are used-car dealers: basically, these are the 95 participants from the Regime 2 auctions.10 In table
8, we present descriptive statistics concerning “Dealers” and “Non-Dealers” under Regime 4. Interestingly,
on average, the Dealers paid over twenty-ﬁve percent more than the Non-Dealers for vehicles under bilateral
bargaining—negotiation; the p-value of the asymptotic test statistic is less than 0.001. What is more, the
bi-modality in the estimated kernel-smoothed densities remains after we control for whether a buyer is a
Dealer or a Non-Dealer, as one can see from the estimated kernel-smoothed densities in ﬁgure 12.
4. Summary and Conclusions. In this paper, we have presented results derived from a unique new
dataset concerning the revenues earned by a large rental car company for used cars it sold under a variety of
selling mechanisms. This company experimented with several different mechanisms to dispose of unwanted
vehicles, including designing a unique new “Internet auction” which, to our knowledge, has never been
previously implemented, nor analyzed theoretically. Using simple empirical methods, we have analyzed
these data to shed light on the effect these diffferent selling mechanisms had on the average revenues earned
by the rental car company. Our empirical results are potentially subject to alternative interpretations.
On the one hand, in general, we found that the average traded prices were the highest when vehicles
were sold at the auctions conducted by the auction house, which used an oral, ascending-price format—the
standard English auction. On the other hand, the English auctions conducted by the rental car company itself
10Not all of our Regime 4 sales include a winner identiﬁcation number. Hence, in the analysis reported, we have a smaller sample
than we did in the analysis above.20 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST





















































FIG 9. Estimated Kernel-Smoothed Densities of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized, Model C
yielded the lowest average revenues. What explains the difference?
As we noted in the introduction, the rental car company suspected collusion at the English auctions it
conducted at each of its rental locations. In an attempt to thwart collusion, the company developed the
Internet auction format, and this greatly reduced the information provided to participants. We found that
the average traded prices the company earned at these Internet auctions were indeed greater than the those
garnered at the English auctions conducted at each of its rental locations. One interpretation of this result is
that the company’s switch to the Internet auctions was successful in thwarting collusion, which explains the
apparent violation of the linkage principle; viz., an auction format that provided less information to bidders
actually generated higher average revenues to the seller.
Another potential explanation exists for the increase in average traded prices: the increase in average
traded prices that the rental car company earned from its Internet auctions obtained because the number of
potential buyers increased. This increased number of potential buyers alone, even in the absence of collusion,
issufﬁcienttoexplainwhytheaveragetradedpricesearnedbythecompany atitsInternetauctionsincreased.
Unfortuately, the data the rental car company provided us do not allow us to determine the number of
potential buyers who participated at the English auctions conducted at each of its rental locations, although
we do know the exact number of participants at each Internet auction. Our lack of data concerning the
number of participants means that we cannot rule out the possibility that the increased average traded prices
that the rental car company earned at its Internet auctions obtained mostly because of an increased number
of participants and not necessarily because of collusion at the English auctions conducted at each rental
location.IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 21
TABLE 6






T = 9,081 R2 = 0.44 ˆ s = 0.247
TABLE 7
Sample Descriptive Statistics—Regimes 2, 3 and 4; Mid-Sized Vehicles
Internet English
Variable Statistic Auctions Auctions Bilateral
Rental Car Auction Bargaining
Company House
Mean −0.0032 0.0032 0.0030
St.Dev. 0.2875 0.1743 0.2822
Fitted Residuals Median 0.0319 0.0375 0.0187
Lower Quartile −0.1328 −0.0389 −0.1806
Upper Quartile 0.1884 0.1020 0.1958
Sample Size 4557 3759 765
Similarly, the increase in average traded prices that the company earned at the English auctions conducted
by the auction house could also reﬂect an increased number of participants, rather than providing evidence
supporting the linkage principle. Unfortunately, we do not know how many bidders participated at each of
the English auctions conducted by the auction house, so we cannot rule out the possibility that the increased
average traded prices earned at the English auctions conducted by the auction house obtained mostly because
of an increase in the number of participants, and not because of the linkage principle.
Although our results are equivocal, we believe the most likely explanation for what we have found is
that the rental car company was correct: collusion did exist at the English auctions conducted at each of its
rental locations. The switch to the company’s Internet auction format most likely made it very difﬁcult, if not
impossible, for bidders to collude. The Internet auctions also probably increased the number of participants
at each auction, which may also explain why average traded prices increased when the company switched to
the Internet auction format.
Similarly, when the company switched to the English auctions conducted by the auction house, we believe
that the increase in information provided to participants at these auctions (i.e., the linkage principle) is a
key reason why the average traded prices increased at these auctions. We do not believe that the increase
in average traded prices obtained simply because of an increase in the number of bidders participating at
the sales conducted by the auction house. While we do not know the number of participants at any given
auction, we do know that the pool of potential buyers was larger than the pool of potential buyers at the
Internet auctions conducted by the rental company where there were 91 potential buyers. However, the
relative effects of competition on traded prices when the number of potential buyers is large is much smaller
than when the number of potential buyers is small. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing how many
bidders actually participated (i.e., called-out bids) at the English auctions conducted by the auction house.
We believe that collusion is unlikely to have been an important problem at the English auctions conducted
by the auction house, if it existed at all: with a very large number of bidders participating at each auction,
it would be quite difﬁcult to organize and to police a successful bidding cartel. Nevertheless, the following
seems plausible to us: at the auctions conducted by the rental car company at each of its rental locations,
the small number of potential buyers (who knew one another and who interacted regularly with one another)22 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST

















































































FIG 10. Empirical Distribution Functions of Least-Squares Fitted Residuals—Mid-Sized Vehicles
were probably able to collude successfully.
Thus, while the results of our empirical analysis are relatively unambiguous—the average traded prices
earned by the rental car company at the English auctions conducted by the auction house were the highest,
especially when we note consider the gross traded prices rather than the net traded prices received by the
retntal car company—we cannot be absolutely certain whether the increase in average traded prices reﬂects
primarily the linkage principle or a demand-aggregation effect (i.e., an increased number of participants at
the auctions conducted by the auction house).
Acknowledgements. The authors thank Matthew Chesnes and David McArthur for exceptional re-
search assistance. In addition, Srihari Govindan, Han Hong, Timothy P. Hubbard, Vijay Krishna, Dan Levin,
David P. Porter, and Robert B. Wilson provided helpful comments and useful suggestions on earlier drafts of
the paper. Paarsch gratefully acknowledges that much of the research for this paper was completed while he
was a visiting research scholar at the Center for Economic Institutions in the Institute of Economic Research
at Hitotsubashi University in Kunitachi, Japan.
References.
George A. Akerlof. The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84:
488–500, 1970.
Lawrence M. Ausubel. An efﬁcient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. American Economic Review, 94:1452–1475, 2004.
Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortac ¸su. Economic insights from Internet auctions: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 42:457–486,
2004.IS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 23



















































































FIG 11. Estimated Kernel-Smoothed Densities of Least-Squares Fitted Residuals—Mid-Sized Vehicles
David A. Belsley, Edwin Kuh, and Roy E. Welch. Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Inﬂuential Data and Sources of Collinearity.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980.
Jeremy Bulow and Paul D. Klemperer. Auctions vs. negotiations. American Economic Review, 86:180–194, 1996.
Brent R. Hickman. Electronic auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, in press.
Joel L. Horowitz and Charles F. Manski. What can be learned about population parameters when the data are contaminated? In G.S.
Maddala and C.R. Rao, editors, Handbook of Statistics, Volume 15. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1997.
Peter Huber. Robust Statistics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981.
John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. The winner’s curse and public information in common value auctions. American Economic Review, 76:
894–920, 1986.
John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, and Dan Levin. Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with afﬁliated private values:
A laboratory study. Econometrica, 55:1275–1304, 1987.
Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, and Jean-Francois Richard. Revenue effects and information processing in english common value auctions.
American Economic Review, 86:442–460, 1996.
Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50:1089–1122, 1982.
Roger B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:55–73, 1981.
Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny. Efﬁciency and information aggregation in auctions. Econometrica, 67:895–900, 1999.
John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson. Optimal auctions. American Economic Review, 71:381–392, 1981.
Alvin E. Roth and Axel Ockenfels. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and
Amazon auctions on the Internet. American Economic Review, 92:1093–1103, 2006.
Bernard W. Silverman. Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. London: Chapman and Hall, 1986.
Kenneth Steiglitz. Snipers, Shills, and Sharks: eBay and Human Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Steven Tadelis and Florian Zettelmeyer. The effect of information on auction outcomes: A large scale ﬁeld experiment, typescript,
University of California, Haas School of Business, 2010.
William S. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8–37, 1961.24 S.-J. CHO, H.J. PAARSCH, AND J. RUST
TABLE 8
Sample Descriptive Statistics—Mid-Sized Vehicles, Regime 4, Dealers and Non-Dealers
Variable Statistic Dealers Non-Dealers
Mean 7825.00 5956.57
St.Dev. 2857.66 2135.71
Traded Price Median 6983.83 5569.03
Lower Quartile 5360.47 4722.18
Upper Quartile 10299.63 6315.56
Mean 1144.21 1120.93
St.Dev. 174.50 145.60
Age (in days) Median 1108 1092
Lower Quartile 1054 1041
Upper Quartile 1143 1142
Sample Size 508 317
William S. Vickrey. Auctions and bidding games. In Recent Advances in Game Theory, Princeton Conference Series, 29. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962.
Robert B. Wilson. A bidding model of perfect competition. Review of Economic Studies, 44:511–518, 1977.
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, SILLIM-DONG, GWANAK-GU, SEOUL, 151-746, KOREA
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE, PARKVILLE, VIC, 3010, AUSTRALIA
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK, MD, 20742, USA
E-MAIL: SungCho@SNU.ac.kr
HPaarsch@UniMelb.edu.au
JRust@gemini.econ.umd.eduIS THE ‘LINKAGE PRINCIPLE’ VALID? 25





















































FIG 12. Estimated Kernel-Smoothed Densities of Traded Prices—Mid-Sized, Regime 4, Dealers and Non-Dealers    wp-1 
Center for Economic Institutions Working Paper Series 
 
2000-1  Jean Tirole, “Corporate Governance,” January 2000. 
 
2000-2  Kenneth A. Kim and S. Ghon Rhee, “A Note on Shareholder Oversight and the 
Regulatory Environment: The Japanese Banking Experience,”January 2000. 
 
2000-3  S. Ghon Rhee, “Further Reforms after the “BIG BANG”: The JapaneseGovernment Bond 
Market,”June 2000. 
 
2000-4  Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov , Joseph Fan , and Larry Lang, “Expropriation of Minority 
Shareholders in East Asia,”July 2000. 
 
2000-5  Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan , and Larry Lang, “The Costs of Group 
Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia,” July 2000. 
 
 
2001-1  Masaharu Hanazaki and Akie Takeuchi, “An International Comparison of Corporate 
Investment Behavior -Some Implications for the Governance Structure in Japan-,” February 
2001. 
 
2001-2  Katsuyuki Kubo, “The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Japan and the UK: 
Agency Hypothesis or Joint Determination Hypothesis?” February 2001. 
 
2001-3  Katsuyuki Kubo, “Changes in Directors’ Incentive Plans and the Performance of Firms in 
the UK,” March 2001. 
 
2001-4  Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value: Evidence from 
Thailand,” March 2001. 
 
2001-5  Katsuyuki Kubo, “The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance: Case in 
Japan,” March 2001. 
 
2001-6  Didier Guillot and James R. Lincoln, “The Permeability of Network Boundaries: Strategic 
Alliances in the Japanese Electronics Industry in the 1990s,” March 2001. 
 
2001-7  Naohito Abe, “Ageing and its Macroeconomic Implications-A Case in Japan-,” May 2001. 
 
2001-8  Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “The Equity Ownership Structure of Thai Firms,” July 2001. 
 
2001-9  Megumi Suto, “Capital Structure and Investment Behaviour of Malaysian Firms in the 
1990s--A study of Corporate Governance before the Crisis--,” August 2001. 
 
2001-10  Naohito Abe, Noel Gaston, and Katsuyuki Kubo, “Executive Pay in Japan : The Role of 
Bank-Appointed Monitors and the Main Bank Relationship,” September 2001. 
 
2001-11  Colin Mayer, “The Financing and Governance of New Technologies,” September 2001. 
 
2001-12  Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, “Can the Financial Restraint Hypothesis 
Explain Japan’s Postwar Experience?” September 2001. 
 
2001-13  Shin-ichi Fukuda, “The Role of Long-term Loans for Economic Development: Empirical 
Evidence in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan,” September 2001. 
     wp-2 
2001-14  S. Ghon Rhee, “Further Reforms of the JGB Market for the Promotion of Regional Bond 
Markets,” September 2001. 
 
2001-15  Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, ”The Benefits 
and Costs of Internal Markets: Evidence from Asia’s Financial Crisis,” September 2001. 
 
2001-16  Kenneth A. Kim and John R. Nofsinger, “Institutional Herding, Business Groups, and 
Economic Regimes: Evidence from Japan,” September 2001.   
 
2001-17  Mitsuhiro Fukao, “Financial Deregulations, Weakness of Market Discipline, and Market 
Development: Japan’s Experience and Lessons for Developing Countries,” September 2001. 
 
2001-18  Akio Kuroda and Koichi Hamada, “Towards an Incentive Compatible Financial System: 
Accounting and Managing the Non-Performing Loans,” September 2001. 
 
2001-19  Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, “Japanese Economic Success and the Curious 
Characteristics of Japanese Stock Prices,” September 2001. 
 
2001-20  Miguel A. García-Cestona, “Ownership Structure, Banks and the Role of Stakeholders: The 
Spanish Case,” September 2001. 
 
2001-21  Joseph P. H. Fan and T. J. Wong, “Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness 
of Accounting Earnings in East Asia,” September 2001. 
 
2001-22  Heather Montgomery, “The Effect of the Basel Accord on Bank Lending in Japan,” 
September 2001. 
 
2001-23  Naoyuki Yoshino, Sahoko Kaji, and Ayako Suzuki, “The Basket-peg, Dollar-peg and 
Floating---A Comparative Analysis of Exchange Rate Regimes,” September 2001. 
 
2001-24  Colin Mayer, Koen Schoors, and Yishay Yafeh, “Sources of Funds and Investment 
Strategies of Venture Capital Funds: Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK,” 
September 2001. 
 
2001-25  Yukinobu Kitamura, Megumi Suto, and Juro Teranishi, “Towards a New Architecture for 
the Japanese Financial System: Participation Costs, Intermediated Ownership and Wealth 
Distribution,”September 2001.   
 
 
2002-1  Evgeni Peev, “The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Change in Bulgaria: 
Washington Consensus, Primitive Accumulation of Capital, and Catching-Up in the 1990,” 
March 2002. 
 
2002-2  Naohito Abe, “Saving, Capital Flows, and the Symmetric International Spillover of 
Industrial Policies,” June 2002.   
 
2002-3  Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, “A Review of Japan’s Bank Crisis from the 
Governance Perspective,” July 2002. 
 
2002-4  Chutathong Charumirind, Raja Kali and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Crony Lending: 
Thailand before the Financial Crisis,” September 2002. 
 
2002-5  Maitreesh Ghatak and Raja Kali, “Financially Interlinked Business Groups,” September 
2002. 
 
2002-6  Tarun Khanna, Joe Kogan, and Krishna Palepu, “Globalization and Similarities in Corporate 
Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis,” September 2002.     wp-3 
 
2002-7  Chongwoo Choe, “Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies,” September 2002. 
 
2002-8  Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh, “Business Groups and Risk Sharing around the World,” 
September 2002. 
 
2002-9  Yitae Kim, Kwangwoo Park, Ronald A. Ratti, and Hyun-Han Shin, “Do Main Banks Extract 
Rents from their Client Firms? Evidence from Korean Chaebol,” September 2002. 
 
2002-10  Armen Hovakimian, Edward J. Kane and Luc Laeven, “How Country and Safety-Net 
Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting,” September 2002. 
 
2002-11  Vidhan K. Goyal and Takeshi Yamada, “Asset Price Shocks, Financial Constraint, and 
Investment: Evidence from Japan,” September 2002.   
 
2002-12  Clive S. Lennox, “Opinion Shopping and Audit Committees,” September 2002.   
 
2002-13  Seki Obata, “Pyramid Business Groups in East Asia: Insurance or Tunneling? ,” September 
2002. 
 
2002-14  Ishtiaq Pasha Mahmood and Will Mitchell, “Two Faces: Effects of Business Groups on 
Innovation in Emerging Economies,” September 2002. 
 
2002-15  Kwangwoo Park, “Foreign Ownership and Firm Value in Japan,” September 2002.   
 
2002-16  Adrian van Rixtel, Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Toshiyuki Souma, and Kazunori Suzuki, 
“ Banking in Japan: Will “To Big To Fail” Prevail?” December 2002.   
 
2002-17  Stijn Claessens and Leora F. Klapper, “Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of its 
Relative Use,” December 2002.   
 
 
2003-1  Anya Khanthavit, Piruna Polsiri, and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Did Families Lose or 
Gain Control after the East Asian Financial Crisis?” February 2003. 
 
2003-2  Hidenobu Okuda, Hidetoshi Hashimoto, and Michiko Murakami, “The Estimation of 
Stochastic Cost Functions of Malaysian Commercial Banks and Its Policy Implications to 
Bank Restructuring,” February 2003. 
 
2003-3  Masaharu Hanazaki and Liuqun, “Asian Crisis and Corporate Governance, (in Japanese)” 
March 2003. 
 
2003-4  Fukuju Yamazaki and Hiroyuki Seshita, ”Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy law in Japan, 
(in Japanese)” February 2003. 
 
2003-5  Hirofumi Uchida and Hiroshi Osano, “Bank Monitoring and Corporate Governance in Japan, 
(in Japanese)” March 2003. 
 
2003-6  Fukunari Kimura and Kozo Kiyota, “Foreign Ownership and Corporate Performance: 
Evidence from Japanese Micro Data, (in Japanese)” March 2003. 
 
2003-7  Yukinobu Kitamura, “Corporate Profit and Debt- Panel Data Analysis of The Japanese 
Firms in the 1990s, (in Japanese)” March 2003. 
 
2003-8  Chaiyasit Aunchitworawong, Toshiyuki Soma, and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, "Do 
Families Control Banks Prevail after the East Asia Financial Crisis? Evidence from 
Thailand" March 2003.     wp-4 
 
2003-9  Junko Maru, Yasuhiro Yonezawa and Yuki Matsumoto, "Corporate Governance by Foreign 
Investors in East Asia Corporations (in Japanese)" March 2003. 
 
2003-10  Sui Qing-yuan, "Declining Firm's Dependence upon Bank Borrowing and Corporate 
Performance (in Japanese)" March 2003. 
 
2003-11  Katsumi Matsuura, "Changes in Ownership Structures and Their Impacts upon Corporate 
Performance in Japan (in Japanese)" March 2003. 
 
2003-12  Kathy S. He, Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, “Corporate Stability and Economic 
Growth,” May 2003. 
 
2003-13  Robert Dekle and Heajin Ryoo, “Exchange Rate Fluctuations, Financing Constraints, 
Hedging, and Exports: Evidence from Firm Level Data,” June 2003. 
 
2003-14  Tsun-Siou Lee, Yin-Hua Yeh and Rong-Tze Liu, ”Can Corporate Governance Variables 
Enhance the Prediction Power of Accounting-Based Financial Distress Prediction Models?,” 
June 2003. 
 
2003-15  Hideaki Miyajima and Yishay Yafeh, “Japan’s Banking Crisis: Who has the Most to 
Lose? ,” June 2003. 
 
2003-16  Guifen Pei, “Asset Management Companies in China,” June 2003.   
 
2003-17  Takeshi Nagase, “The Governance Structure of IPO Firm in Japan,” July 2003. 
 
2003-18  Masaharu Hanazaki and Qun Liu, “The Asian Crisis and Corporate Governance ― 
Ownership Structure, Debt Financing, and Corporate Diversification ― ,” July 2003. 
 
2003-19  Chutatong Charumilind, Raja Kali and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Connected Lending: 
Thailand before the Financial Crisis,” July 2003. 
 
2003-20  Gilles Hilary and Tomoki Oshika, “Shareholder activism in Japan: social pressure, private 
cost and organized crime,” August 2003. 
 
2003-21  Sanghoon Ahn, “Technology Upgrading with Learning Cost,” September 2003.   
 
2003-22  Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, “Have Banks Contributed to Efficient 
Management in Japan’s Manufacturing? ,” November 2003. 
 
2003-23  Chongwoo Choe and In-Uck Park, “Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies,” 
November 2003. 
 
2003-24  Bruno Dallago, ”Comparative Economic Systems and the New Comparative Economics: 
Foes, Competitors, or Complementary?,” November 2003. 
 
2003-25  Adrian van Rixtel, Ioana Alexopoulou and Kimie Harada, “The New Basel Capital Accord 
and Its Impact on Japanese Banking: A Qualitative Analysis,” November 2003. 
 
 
2004-1  Masaharu Hanazaki, Toshiyuki Souma and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Silent Large 
Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management: Evidence from Banking Crisis in Japan,” 
January 2004. 
 
2004-2  Ming Ming Chiu and Sung Wook Joh, “Bank Loans to Distressed Firms: Cronyism, bank 
governance and economic crisis,” January 2004.     wp-5 
 
 
2004-3  Keun Lee, Keunkwan Ryu and Jungmo Yoon, “Corporate Governance and Long Term 
Performance of the Business Groups: The Case of Chaebols in Korea,” January 2004. 
 
2004-4  Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, “Been There, Done That –The History of Corporate 
Ownership in Japan,” March 2004. 
 
2004-5  Dong-Hua Chen, Joseph P. H. Fan and T. J. Wong, ”Politically-connected CEOs, Corporate 
Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Partially Privatized Firms,” March 2004. 
 
2004-6  Jae-Seung Baek, Jun-Koo Kang and Inmoo Lee, “Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence 
from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols,” March 2004. 
 
2004-7  E. Han Kim, “To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation,” 
March 2004. 
 
2004-8  Yin-Hua Yeh and Tracie Woidtke, “Commitment or Entrenchment?: Controlling 
Shareholders and Board Composition,” June 2004. 
 
2004-9  Hugh Patrick, “Thoughts on Evolving Corporate Governance in Japan,” June 2004. 
 
2004-10  Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, “When No Law is Better than a Good Law”, June 
2004. 
 
2004-11  Sanghoon Ahn, Utpal Bhattacharya, Taehun Jung and Giseok Nam, “Do Japanese CEOs 
Matter?”, June 2004. 
 
2004-12  Megumi Suto and Masashi Toshino, “Behavioural Biases of Japanese Institutional 
Investors; Fund management and Corporate Governance”, July 2004. 
 
2004-13  Piruna Polsiri and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Business Groups in Thailand: Before and 
after the East Asian Financial Crisis”, August 2004.   
 
2004-14  Fumiharu Mieno, “Fund Mobilization and Investment Behavior in Thai Manufacturing 
Firms in the Early 1990s”, August 2004. 
 
2004-15  Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, “Deposit Insurance, Corporate Governance and Discretionary 
Behavior: Evidence from Thai Financial Institutions”, September 2004. 
 
2004-16  Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, “Financial fragility under implicit insurance scheme: Evidence 
from the collapse of Thai financial institutions”, September 2004. 
 
2004-17  Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, “Ownership-based Incentives, Internal Corporate Risk and 
Firm Performance”, September 2004. 
 
2004-18  Jack Ochs and In-Uck Park, “Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation 
of Networks”, September 2004. 
 
2004-19  Hidenobu Okuda and Suvadee Rungsomboon, “Comparative Cost Study of Foreign and 
Thai Domestic Banks 1990–2002: Estimating Cost Functions of the Thai Banking   
Industry,” February 2005. 
 
2004-20  Hidenobu Okuda and Suvadee Rungsomboon, ”The Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on the 
Thai Banking Market: Empirical Analysis from 1990 to 2002,“ March 2005.   
     wp-6 
2004-21  Juro Teranishi, “Investor Right in Historical Perspective: Globalization and the Future of the 
Japanese Firm and Financial System,” March 2005. 
 
2004-22  Kentaro Iwatsubo, “Which Accounts for Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations, Deviations from 
the Law of One Price or Relative Price of Nontraded Goods?”, March 2005. 
 
2004-23  Kentaro Iwatsubo and Tomoyuki Ohta, ”Causes and effects of exchange rate regimes (in 
Japanese),” March 2005. 
 
2004-24  Kentaro Iwatsubo, “Bank Capital Shocks and Portfolio Risk: Evidence from Japan,” March 
2005. 
 




2005-1  Yishay P. Yafeh and Tarun Khanna, “Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or 
Parasities?,” September 2005. 
 
2005-2  Renee B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira, “Do Directors Perform for Pay?," September 2005. 
 
2005-3  Qun Liu, Shin-ichi Fukuda and Juro Teranishi, “What are Characteristics of Financial 
Systems in East Asia as a Region?.” September 2005. 
 
2005-4  Juro Teranishi, “Is the Financial System of Postwar Japan Bank-dominated or Market 
Based?,” September 2005. 
 
2005-5  Hasung Jang, Hyung-cheol Kang and Kyung Suh Park, “Determinants of Family 
Ownership: The Choice between Control and Performance,” October 2005. 
 
2005-6  Hasung Jang, Hyung-cheol Kang and Kyung Suh Park, “The Choice of Group Structure: 
Divide and Rule,” October 2005. 
 
2005-7  Sangwoo Lee, Kwangwoo Park and Hyun-Han Shin, “The Very Dark Side of International 
Capital Markets: Evidence from Diversified Business Groups in Korea,” October 2005. 
 
2005-8  Allen N. Berger, Richard J. Rosen and Gregory F. Udell, “Does Market Size Structure 
Affect Competition? The Case of Small Business Lending,” November 2005. 
 
2005-9  Aditya Kaul and Stephen Sapp, “Trading Activity and Foreign Exchange Market Quality,” 
November 2005. 
 
2005-10  Xin Chang, Sudipto Dasgupta and Gilles Hilary, “The Effect of Auditor Choice on 
Financing Decisions,” December 2005. 
 
2005-11  Kentaro Iwatsubo, “Adjustment Speeds of Nominal Exchange Rates and Prices toward 
Purchasing Power Parity,” January 2006. 
 
2005-12  Giovanni Barone-Adesi, Robert Engle and Loriano Mancini, “GARCH Options in 
Incomplete Markets”, March 2006. 
 
2005-13  Aditya Kaul, Vikas Mehrotra and Blake Phillips, “Ownership, Foreign Listings, and Market 
Valuation”, March 2006. 
 
2005-14  Ricard Gil, “Renegotiation, Learning and Relational Contracting”, March 2006. 
     wp-7 
2005-15  Randall Morck, “How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups -The Double Taxation of 
Inter-corporate Dividends and other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy-”, March 2006. 
 
2005-16  Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong and Tianyu Zhang, “The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in 
China”, March 2006. 
 
2005-17  Yan Du, Qianqiu Liu and S. Ghon Rhee, “An Anatomy of the Magnet Effect: Evidence 
from the Korea Stock Exchange High-Frequency Data”, March 2006.   
 
2005-18  Kentaro Iwatsubo and Junko Shimizu, “Signaling Effects of Foreign Exchange Interventions 
and Expectation Heterogeneity among Traders”, March 2006. 
 
2005-19  Kentaro Iwatsubo, “Current Account Adjustment and Exchange Rate Pass-Through(in 
Japanese)”, March 2006. 
 
2005-20  Piruna Polsiri and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Corporate Governance of Banks in 
Thailand”, March 2006. 
 
 
2006-1  Hiroyuki Okamuro and Jian Xiong Zhang, “Ownership Structure and R&D Investment of 
Japanese Start-up Firms,” June 2006. 
 
2006-2  Hiroyuki Okamuro, “Determinants of R&D Activities by Start-up Firms: Evidence from 
Japan,” June 2006. 
 
2006-3  Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong and Tianyu Zhang, “The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in 
China,” August 2006. 
 
2006-4  Pramuan Bunkanwanicha, Jyoti Gupta and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Pyramiding of 
Family-owned Banks in Emerging Markets,” September 2006.   
 
2006-5  Bernardo Bortolotti and Mara Faccio, “Reluctant privatization,” September 2006. 
 
2006-6  Jörn Kleinert and Farid Toubal, “Distance costs and Multinationals’ foreign activities”, 
October 2006. 
 
2006-7  Jörn Kleinert and Farid Toubal, “Dissecting FDI”, October 2006. 
 
2006-8  Shin-ichi Fukuda and Satoshi Koibuchi, “The Impacts of “Shock Therapy” on Large and 
Small Clients: Experiences from Two Large Bank Failures in Japan”, October 2006. 
 
2006-9  Shin-ichi Fukuda, Munehisa Kasuya and Kentaro Akashi, “The Role of Trade Credit for 
Small Firms: An Implication from Japan’s Banking Crisis”, October 2006. 
 
2006-10  Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Big Business Owners and 
Politics: Investigating the Economic Incentives of Holding Top Office”, October 2006. 
 
2006-11  Sang Whi Lee, Seung-Woog(Austin) Kwang, Donald J. Mullineaux and Kwangwoo Park, 
“Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, and Syndicate Structure: Evidence from Japanese 
Borrowers”, October 2006. 
 
2006-12  Masaharu Hanazaki and Qun Liu, “Corporate Governance and Investment in East Asian 
Firms -Empirical Analysis of Family-Controlled Firms”, October 2006.   
 
2006-13  Kentaro Iwatsubo and Konomi Tonogi, “Foreign Ownership and Firm Value: Identification 
through Heteroskedasticity (in Japanese)”, December 2006. 
     wp-8 
2006-14  Kentaro Iwatsubo and Kazuyuki Inagaki, “Measuring Financial Market Contagion Using 
Dually-Traded Stocks of Asian Firms”, December 2006. 
 
2006-15  Hun-Chang Lee, “When and how did Japan catch up with Korea? –A comparative study of 
the pre-industrial economies of Korea and Japan”, February 2007. 
 
2006-16  Kyoji Fukao, Keiko Ito, Shigesaburo Kabe, Deqiang Liu and Fumihide Takeuchi, “Are 
Japanese Firms Failing to Catch up in Localization? An Empirical Analysis Based on 
Affiliate-level Data of Japanese Firms and a Case Study of the Automobile Industry in 
China”, February 2007.   
 
2006-17  Kyoji Fukao, Young Gak Kim and Hyeog Ug Kwon, “Plant Turnover and TFP Dynamics in 
Japanese Manufacturing”, February 2007.   
 
2006-18  Kyoji Fukao, Keiko Ito, Hyeg Ug Kwon and Miho Takizawa, “Cross-Border Acquisitons 
and Target Firms' Performance: Evidence from Japanese Firm-Level Data”, February 2007.   
 
2006-19  Jordan Siegel and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, “Expropriators or Turnaround Artists? The Role of 
Controlling Families in South Korea (1985-2003)”, March 2007. 
 
2006-20  Francis Kramarz and David Thesmar, “Social Networks in The Boardroom”, March 2007. 
 




2007-1  Ichiro Iwasaki, “Endogenous board formation and its determinants in a transition economy: 
evidence from Russia*”, April 2007, Revised on October 2007. 
 
2007-2  Joji Tokui, Tomohiko Inui, and Katsuaki Ochiai, “The Impact of Vintage Capital and R&D 
on Japanese Firms’ Productivity”, April 2007. 
 
2007-3  Yasuo Nakanishi and Tomohiko Inui, “Deregulation and Productivity in Japanese 
Industries”, April 2007. 
 
2007-4  Kyoji Fukao, “The Performance of Foreign Firms and the Macroeconomic Impact of FDI”, 
May 2007. 
 
2007-5  Taku Suzuki, “The Role of the State in Economic Growth of Post-Communist Transitional 
Countries”, June 2007.   
 
2007-6  Michiel van Leuvensteijn, Jacob A. Bikker, Adrian A.R.J.M. van Rixtel and Christoffer 
Kok-Sørensen*, “A new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro 
area”, June 2007. 
 
2007-7  Sea Jin Chang, Jaiho Chung, and Dean Xu, “FDI and Technology Spillovers in China”, July 
2007. 
 
2007-8  Fukunari Kimura, “The mechanics of production networks in Southeast Asia: the 
fragmentation theory approach”, July 2007. 
 
2007-9  Kyoji Fukao, Tsutomu Miyagawa, Miho Takizawa, “Productivity Growth and Resource 
Reallocation in Japan”, November 2007. 
 
2007-10  YoungGak Kim, “A Survey on Intangible Capital”, December 2007.   
     wp-9 
2007-11  Sea-Jing Chang and Jay Hyuk Rhee, “Rapid International Expansion Strategy of Emerging 
Market Enterprises: The Interplay between Speed and Competitive Risks on International 
performance”, November 2007. 
 
2007-12  Ishtiaq Mahmood, Will Mitchell, and Chi-Nien Chung, “The Structure of Intra-Group Ties: 
Innovation in Taiwanese Business”, January 2008. 
 
2007-13  Kyoji Fukao, Tomohiko Inui, Shigesaburo Kabe and Deqiang Liu, “ An International 
Comparison of the TFP Levels of Japanese, Korean and Chinese Listed Firms“, March 
2008. 
 
2007-14  Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Allocating Risk Across 
Pyramidal Tiers: Evidence from Thai Business Groups”, March 2008. 
 
 
2008-1  Rüdiger Fahlenbrach and René M. Stulz, "Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm 
Value", April 2008. 
 
2008-2  Morten Bennedsen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, and, Thomas Vester Nielsen, “Private 
Contracting and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Provision of Tag-Along Rights 
in an Emerging Market”, April 2008. 
 
2008-3  Joseph P.H. Fan, Jun Huang, Felix Oberholzer-Gee, and Mengxin Zhao, “Corporate 
Diversification in China: Causes and Consequences”, April 2008. 
 
2008-4  Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Ferreira, Clara C. Raposo, “Board Structure and Price 
Informativeness”, April 2008. 
 
2008-5  Nicola Gennaioli and Stefano Rossi, “Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy”, April 
2008. 
 
2008-6  Nicola Gennaioli and Stefano Rossi, “Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by 
Contract”, April 2008. 
 
2008-7  Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira, “Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on 
Governance and Performance”, April 2008. 
 
2008-8  Worawat Margsiri, Antonio S. Melloy, and Martin E. Ruckesz, “A Dynamic Analysis of 
Growth via Acquisition”, April 2008. 
 
2008-9  Pantisa Pavabutra and Sukanya Prangwattananon, “Tick Size Change on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand”, April 2008. 
 
2008-10  Maria Boutchkova, Hitesh Doshi, Art Durnev, and Alexander Molchanov, “Politics and 
Volatility”, April 2008. 
 
2008-11  Yan-Leung Cheung, P. Raghavendra Rau, and Aris Stouraitis, “The Helping Hand, the Lazy 
Hand, or the Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Publicly Listed 
Firms in China”, April 2008. 
 
2008-12  Art Durnev and Larry Fauver, “Stealing from Thieves: Firm Governance and Performance 
when States are Predatory”, April 2008. 
 
2008-13  Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro, and Mengxin Zhao, “Determinants of the Size and Structure of 
Corporate Boards: 1935-2000”, April 2008. 
     wp-10 
2008-14  Ishtiaq P. Mahmood, Hong-Jin Zhu and Edward J. Zajac, “Where Can Capabilities Come 
From? How the Content of Network Ties Affects Capability Acquisition”, April 2008. 
 
2008-15  Vladimir I. Ivanov and Ronald W. Masulis, “Corporate Venture Capital, Strategic Alliances, 
and the Governance of Newly Public Firms”, May 2008. 
 
2008-16  Dick Beason, Ken Gordon, Vikas Mehrotra and Akiko Watanabe, “Does Restructuring Pay 




2009-1  Vikas Mehrotra, Dimitri van Schaik, Jaap Spronk, and Onno Steenbeek, “Creditor-Focused 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan,” August, 2009. 
 
2009-2  Debin Ma, “Law and Economic Change in Traditional China: A Comparative Perspective,” 
September, 2009. 
 
2009-3  Robert C. Allen, Jean-Pascal Bassino, Debin Ma, Christine Moll-Murata, and Jan Luiten van 
Zanden, “Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China, 1738-1925: in Comparison with 
Europe, Japan, and India,” June 2009. 
 
2009-4  Jung-Wook Shim, “The Existence of Nepotism: Evidence from Japanese Family Firms,” 
October 2009.   
 
2009-5  Morten Bennedsen and Kasper Meisner Nielsen, “Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in 
European Ownership,” March 2009. 
 
2009-6  Joseph P.H. Fan, TJ Wong, Tianyu Zhang, “Founder Succession and Accounting Properties,” 
April 2009.     
 
2009-7  Hiroyuki Okamuro, Masatoshi Kato, and Yuji Honjo, “Determinants of R&D Cooperation in 
Japanese High-tech Start-ups,” November 2009. 
 
2009-8  Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, and Qiang Wu, “The Effectiveness of 
Corporate Boards: Evidence from Bank Loan Contracting,” November 2009. 
 
2009-9  Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan and Mingming Zhou, “The Effects of Focus Versus 
Diversification on Bank Performance: Evidence from Chinese Banks,” November 2009.   
 
2009-10  Leonardo Becchetti, Andrea Carpentieri and Iftekhar Hasan, ”The Determinants of Option 
Adjusted Delta Credit Spreads: A Comparative Analysis on US, UK and the Eurozone,” 
November 2009. 
 
2009-11  Luciano I. de Castro and Harry J. Paarsch, “Testing Affiliation in Private-values Models of 
First-price Auctions Using Grid Distributions,” December 2009. 
 
2009-12  Chulwoo Baek, YoungGak Kim and Heog Ug Kwon, “Market Competition and Productivity 
after the Asian Financial Crisis: Evidence from Korean Firm Level Data,” December 2009. 
     wp-11 
2009-13  Jee-Hyeong Park, Stephen J. Spurr, and Sheng-Kai Chang, “A Model of Hierarchical 
Professionals: Cooperation and Conflict between Anesthesiologists and CRNAs,” October 
2009.   
 
2009-14  Jee-Hyeong Park, “Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private 
Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and the Possible Role of the WTO,” December 2009. 
 
2009-15  Yuji Honjo, Masatoshi Kato and Hiroyuki Okamuro, “R&D financing of start-up firms: 
How much does founders’ human capital matter?”, March 2010. 
 
 
2010-1  Sergei V. Ryazantsev, “Migrant Workers from Central Asian Russian Federation”, June 
2010.   
 
2010-2  Tue Gørgens, Xin Meng, and Rhema Vaithianathan, “Stunting and Selection Effects of 
Famine: A Case Study of the Great Chinese Famine,” October 2010. 
 
2010-3  Masatoshi Kato and Yuji Honjo, “Heterogeneous Exits: Evidence from New Firms,” 
November 2010. 
 
2010-4  Sung-Jin Cho, Harry J. Paarsch, and John Rust,  “Is the ’Linkage Principle’ Valid?:   
Evidence from the Field,” November 2010.   
 
 
 